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Abstract
We study the algorithmics of information structure design — a.k.a. persuasion or signaling — in
a fundamental special case introduced by Arieli and Babichenko: multiple agents, binary actions, and
no inter-agent externalities. Unlike prior work on this model, we allow many states of nature. We
assume that the principal’s objective is a monotone set function, and study the problem both in the public
signal and private signal models, drawing a sharp contrast between the two in terms of both efficacy and
computational complexity.
When private signals are allowed, our results are largely positive and quite general. First, we use lin-
ear programming duality and the equivalence of separation and optimization to show polynomial-time
equivalence between (exactly) optimal signaling and the problem of maximizing the objective function
plus an additive function. This yields an efficient implementation of the optimal scheme when the ob-
jective is supermodular or anonymous. Second, we exhibit a (1 − 1/e)-approximation of the optimal
private signaling scheme, modulo an additive loss of ǫ, when the objective function is submodular. These
two results simplify, unify, and generalize results of [3, 4], extending them from a binary state of nature
to many states (modulo the additive loss in the latter result). Third, we consider the binary-state case
with a submodular objective, and simplify and slightly strengthen the result of [4] to obtain a (1− 1/e)-
approximation via a scheme which (i) signals independently to each receiver and (ii) is “oblivious” in
that it does not depend on the objective function so long as it is monotone submodular.
When only a public signal is allowed, our results are negative. First, we show that it is NP-hard to
approximate the optimal public scheme, within any constant factor, even when the objective is additive.
Second, we show that the optimal private scheme can outperform the optimal public scheme, in terms of
maximizing the sender’s objective, by a polynomial factor.
1 Introduction
Information structure design studies how beliefs influence behavior, both of individuals and of groups,
and how to shape those beliefs in order to achieve desired outcomes. The key object of study here is
the information structure, which describes “who knows what” about the parameters governing the payoff
function of a game of incomplete information. These parameters, collectively termed the state of nature,
encode uncertainty in the environment, and their prior distribution together with the information structure
determine agents’ equilibrium behavior.
When studied descriptively, information structures lend structural insight into the space of potential
equilibria of a game of incomplete information (termed Bayes correlated equilibria in [6]), and can provide
answers to comparative statics questions regarding the provision or withholding of information. The asso-
ciated prescriptive questions are fundamentally algorithmic, and are often termed persuasion or signaling.
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Persuasion is the task faced by a principal — call her the sender —who has privileged access to the state of
nature, and can selectively provide information to the agent(s) in the game — call him/them the receiver(s)
— in order to further her own objectives. Such a sender effectively designs the information structure, and
faces the algorithmic problem of selecting which of her information to reveal, to whom, and whether and
how to add noise to this information. As in much of the prior work in this area, when we think of the
information structure as an algorithm implemented by the sender, we call it a signaling scheme.
Both descriptive and prescriptive questions in this space have enjoyed an explosion of research interest
of late, in particular at the intersection of economics and computer science. Our discussion can not do justice
to the large literature in this area, including the wealth of work on related models. We therefore refer the
curious reader to the recent survey by [18] and the references therein. The model we focus on in this paper,
and for which we provide a thorough exploration through the algorithmic lens, is the fundamental special
case of the multi-agent persuasion problem when restricted to binary actions and no externalities.
Our Model and its Significance
Our technical and conceptual starting point, and arguably the most influential model in this area, is the
Bayesian persuasion model of [22]. Here the sender faces a single receiver, and her task is to persuade
the receiver to take an action which is more favored by the sender. As in persuasion more generally, the
sender’s “leverage” is her informational advantage — namely, access to the realization of the state of nature,
which determines the payoffs of the actions to both the receiver and the sender. The receiver, in contrast,
a-priori knows nothing about the state of nature besides its prior distribution (the common prior). Kamenica
and Gentzkow [22] assume that the sender can commit to her policy for revealing the information prior to
realization of the state of nature, and study how and when this signaling scheme can increase the sender’s
utility.
The model we use is one recently proposed by Arieli and Babichenko [3], both generalizing and re-
stricting aspects of the model of [22]. Here the sender interacts with multiple receivers, each of whom is
restricted to a binary choice of actions. Without loss, we denote these actions by 1 and 0. As mentioned in
[3, 4], settings like this arise when a manager seeks to persuade investors to invest in a project, or when a
principal persuades opinion leaders in a social network with the goal of maximizing social influence. Each
receiver’s utility depends only on his own action and the state of nature, but crucially not on the actions of
other receivers — the no externality assumption. The sender’s utility, on the other hand, depends on the
state of nature as well as the profile of receiver actions — since actions are binary, the sender’s utility can
be viewed as a set function on receivers. As in [22], the state of nature is drawn from a common prior, and
the sender can commit to a policy of revealing information regarding the realization of the state of nature.
Since there are multiple receivers, this policy — the information structure — is more intricate, since it can
reveal different, and correlated, information to different receivers. As made clear in [3], such flexibility is
crucial to the sender unless receivers are homogeneous and the sender’s utility function highly structured
(for example, additively separable across receivers). In particular, if restricted to a public communication
channel, the sender is limited in her ability to discriminate between receivers and correlate their actions,
whereas a private communication channel provides more flexibility.
Our results, and the models of Kamenica and Gentzkow [22] and Arieli and Babichenko [3], are crucially
underlied by the assumption that the sender has the power of commitment to a signaling scheme. The
commitment assumption is not as unrealistic as it might first sound, and a number of arguments to that effect
are provided in [25, 22, 18]. We mention one of those arguments here: commitment arises organically at
equilibrium if the sender and receiver(s) interact repeatedly over a long horizon, in which case commitment
can be thought of as a proxy for “establishing credibility.”
If one permits commitment by the sender, restricts attention to a common prior distribution, and pos-
tulates that receiver(s) are not privately informed through channels not controlled by the sender, then the
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model of [22] is the special case of persuasion for a single receiver, and the model of [3] is the special
case of persuasion for multiple receivers with binary actions and no externalities. Viewed this way, both
are fundamental special cases of the general information structure design problem, meaningfully restricted.
It is thus only fitting that they be thoroughly explored via an algorithmic lens, en-route to a more general
understanding of the algorithmics of information in multi-agent settings. A computational study of the
single-receiver Bayesian persuasion model of [22] was undertaken by Dughmi and Xu [15]. As for multi-
agent persuasion with binary actions and no externalities, a partial algorithmic understanding is provided by
[3, 4] in the special case of a binary state of nature, and this paper picks up there.
Context: Private and Public Persuasion
At their most general, signaling schemes can reveal different information to different receivers, through pri-
vate communication channels. Such schemes play a dual role: they inform receivers, possibly asymmetri-
cally, and they coordinate their behavior by correlating the information provided. In some settings, however,
such private communication channels are unrealistic, and the sender is constrained to a public communica-
tion channel. Work on both descriptive and prescriptive questions regarding information structure design in
multi-agent settings can be classified along these lines. The extent to which a public communication channel
limits the sender’s powers of persuasion is a fundamental question which has not been thoroughly explored.
Much of the earlier work on information structure design, in particular its computational aspects, fo-
cused on public signaling models. This includes work on signaling in auctions [19, 8, 21, 16], voting [2],
routing [7], and abstract game models [17, 14, 7, 26]. The work of [14] is relevant to this paper, in that
they identify conditions under which public persuasion problems are tractable to approximate, and prove
impossibility results in some cases where those conditions are violated. Our hardness proof in Section 6 is
in part based on some of their ideas.
Private persuasion has been less thoroughly explored, particularly through the computational lens. The
space of (private channel) information structures is studied by Bergemann and Morris [6], who observe that
these information structures and their associated equilibria form a generalization of correlated equilibria,
and term the generalization the Bayes Correlated Equilibrium (BCE). The space of BCEs is characterized
in two-agent two-action games by [27]. Moreover, recent work explores private persuasion in the context of
voting [29, 13, 5] and network routing [28].
Arieli and Babichenko [3] pose the model we consider in this paper, with the goal of studying private
persuasion. We believe that their model wisely simplifies the general multi-agent persuasion problem by
removing the most thorny aspect limiting progress in the study of private schemes: externalities. Specifi-
cally, by assuming that receivers only influence each others’ payoffs through the choices of the sender, they
sidestep the equilibrium selection and computation concerns which would arise in more general settings.
Assuming a binary state of nature, Arieli and Babichenko [3] provide explicit characterizations of the op-
timal private signaling scheme for three of the most natural classes of sender objective functions: viewing
the sender’s objective as a set function on receivers, those are supermodular, anonymous monotone sub-
modular, and supermajority functions. In all three cases, their characterization can be easily converted to an
efficient algorithm. Moreover Arieli and Babichenko [3] provide necessary and sufficient conditions under
which public signaling schemes match the performance of private signaling schemes. In follow-up work,
Babichenko and Barman [4] also consider the binary state setting, and reduce the private persuasion problem
to the problem of computing the concave closure of the sender’s utility function. This connection yields a
(1− 1e−ǫ)-approximate private signaling scheme for monotone submodular utility functions, and an optimal
private scheme for anonymous utility functions. Moreover, they show that the former approximation result
is almost tight, assuming P 6= NP .
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Our Results and Techniques
In Section 3, we examine private signaling in our model in the presence of many states of nature. When
the sender’s set-function objective is monotone non-decreasing, and the prior distribution is given as input,
we show the polynomial-time equivalence of optimal (private) persuasion and the algorithmic problem of
maximizing the sender’s objective function plus an additive function (subject to no constraints).1 The proof
relies on a linear programming formulation of private persuasion, LP duality, and the equivalence of separa-
tion and optimization. This leads to polynomial-time persuasion algorithms when the sender’s objective is
anonymous or supermodular. Our results here are similar to the line of research on optimal mechanism de-
sign [9, 10, 11], in that both relate economic design problems with Bayesian incentive constraints to purely
algorithmic problems. However, our techniques are different from those in [9, 10, 11].
Next, we consider a sender with a monotone submodular objective, and efficiently compute a private
signaling scheme which is (1 − 1e )-approximately optimal for the sender, modulo an arbitrarily small ad-
ditive ǫ. This generalizes the result of [4] from two states of nature to many states, modulo the additive
loss. The techniques used in [4] do not appear to help in the presence of many states of nature, since they
are tied to several structural properties which only hold in the case of a binary state. Therefore, our algo-
rithm uses a different approach, and crucially relies on a new structural property of (approximately) optimal
private signaling schemes. Specifically, we prove that there always exists an ǫ-optimal “simple” private
signaling scheme which is a uniform mixture of polynomially many deterministic schemes, i.e., a scheme
that deterministically sends a signal to each receiver upon receiving a state of nature. Notably, this property
only depends on the monotonicity of the sender’s utility function, and does not rely on submodularity. Us-
ing this property, we then use ideas from the literature on submodular function optimization to compute a
(1− 1e )-approximation to the best “simple” scheme.
We note that our algorithmic results from Sections 3 and 4 can be approximately extended to the sample
oracle model, in which our algorithm is only given sample access to the prior distribution, using ideas
from [15]. The resulting schemes suffer an arbitrarily small additive loss in the sender’s objective and in
persuasiveness of their recommendations, and this loss is unavoidable for information theoretic reasons.
In Section 5, we examine private signaling in the special case with two states of nature and a monotone
submodular objective. We give a simple and explicit construction of a polynomial-time private signaling
scheme that serves as a (1 − 1e )-approximation to the optimal scheme, which is the best possible assuming
P 6= NP as shown by [4]. This result simplifies, and slightly strengthens, a result of [4]. Moreover, the
constructed private scheme has the following distinctive properties: (i) it is independent in that it signals
independently to each receiver in each of the two states of nature; (ii) it is oblivious in the sense that it
does not depend on the sender’s utility function, and the approximation ratio is guaranteed so long as the
function is monotone submodular. To obtain this result, we first use the idea of the correlation gap [1] to
argue that there always exists an independent signaling scheme which is a (1 − 1e ) approximation to the
optimal private scheme. We then exploit the fact that there are two states of nature to argue that our scheme
is the optimal independent scheme, simultaneously for all monotone objectives. We then show two respects
in which this result cannot generalize to many states of nature. First, we show that it is NP-hard to obtain a
(1 − 1e )-approximation to the best independent signaling scheme in multi-state settings. Second, we show
that oblivious schemes cannot guarantee more than a 1√
m−1 fraction of the optimal sender utility where
m > 1 is the number of states of nature.
Finally, in Section 6, we consider public signaling in our model, and present two negative results. First,
we show via a simple example that the optimal private scheme can outperform the optimal public scheme,
in terms of maximizing the sender’s objective, by a polynomial factor. Second, we employ a reduction from
an NP-hard graph coloring promise problem to rule out an algorithm for approximating the optimal public
1We mention that the reduction from our persuasion problem to the set function maximization problem does not require mono-
tonicity, but the opposite reduction does.
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scheme to within any constant factor, and also to rule out an additive PTAS for the problem.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Basic Setup
As in [3], we consider the special case of multi-agent persuasion with binary actions, no inter-agent exter-
nalities, and a monotone objective function. Here, we adopt the perspective of sender facing n receivers.
Each receiver has two actions, which we denote by 0 and 1. The receiver’s payoff depends only on his
own action and a random state of nature θ supported on Θ. In particular, we use ui(θ, 1) and ui(θ, 0) to
denote receiver i’s utility for action 1 and action 0, respectively, at the state of nature θ; as shorthand, we use
ui(θ) = ui(θ, 1)−ui(θ, 0) to denote how much receiver i prefers action 1 over action 0 given state of nature
θ. Note that ui(θ) may be negative. The sender’s utility (our objective) is a function of all the receivers’
actions and the state of nature θ. We use fθ(S) to denote the sender’s utility when the state of nature is θ
and S is the set of receivers who choose action 1. We assume throughout the paper that fθ is a monotone
non-decreasing set function for every θ. For convenience in stating our approximation guarantees, we as-
sume without loss of generality that fθ is normalized so that fθ(∅) = 0 and fθ(S) ∈ [0, 1] for all θ ∈ Θ and
S ⊆ [n].
As is typical in information structure design, we assume that θ is drawn from a common prior distribution
λ, that the sender has access to the realized state of nature, and that the sender can publicly commit to a
policy— termed a signaling scheme— for mapping the realized state of nature to a signal for each receiver.
The signaling scheme may be randomized, and hence reveals noisy partial information regarding the state of
nature. The order of events is as follows: (1) The sender commits to a signaling scheme ϕ; (2) Nature draws
θ ∼ λ; (3) Signals (σ1, . . . , σn) ∼ ϕ(θ) are drawn, and each receiver i receives the signal σi; (4) Receivers
select their actions.
A general signaling scheme permits sending different signals to different receivers through a private
communication channel — we term these private signaling schemes to emphasize this generality. We also
study the special case of public signaling schemes— these are restricted to a public communication channel,
and hence send the same signal to all receivers. We discuss these two signaling models in Sections 2.2 and
2.3, including the equilibrium concept and the induced sender optimization problem for each. In both cases,
we are primarily interested in the optimization problem faced by the sender in step (1), the goal of which
is to maximize the sender’s expected utility. When ϕ yields expected sender utility within an additive
[multiplicative] ǫ of the best possible, we say it is ǫ-optimal [ǫ-approximate] in the additive [multiplicative]
sense.
2.2 Private Signaling Schemes
A private signaling scheme ϕ is a randomized map from the set of states of nature Θ to a set of signal
profiles Σ = Σ1 × Σ2... × Σn, where Σi is the signal set of receiver i. We use ϕ(θ, σ) to denote the
probability of selecting the signal profile σ = (σ1, . . . , σn) ∈ Σ given a state of nature θ. Therefore,∑
σ∈Σ ϕ(θ, σ) = 1 for every θ. With some abuse of notation, we use ϕ(θ) to denote the random signal
profile selected by the scheme ϕ given the state θ. Moreover, for each θ ∈ Θ, i ∈ [n], and σi ∈ Σi, we
use ϕi(θ, σi) = Pr[ϕi(θ) = σi] to denote the marginal probability that receiver i receives signal σi in state
θ. An algorithm implements a signaling scheme ϕ if it takes as input a state of nature θ, and samples the
random variable ϕ(θ).
Given a signaling scheme ϕ, each signal σi ∈ Σi for receiver i is realized with probability Pr(σi) =∑
θ∈Θ λ(θ)ϕi(θ, σi). Upon receiving σi, receiver i performs a Bayesian update and infers a posterior belief
over the state of nature, as follows: the realized state is θ with posterior probability λ(θ)ϕi(θ, σi)/Pr(σi).
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Receiver i then takes the action maximizing his posterior expected utility. In case of indifference, we assume
ties are broken in favor of the sender (i.e., in favor of action 1). Therefore, receiver i chooses action 1 if
1
Pr(σi)
∑
θ∈Θ
λ(θ)ϕi(θ, σi)ui(θ, 1) ≥
1
Pr(σi)
∑
θ∈Θ
λ(θ)ϕi(θ, σi)ui(θ, 0),
or equivalently ∑
θ∈Θ
λ(θ)ϕi(θ, σi)ui(θ) ≥ 0,
where ui(θ) = ui(θ, 1)− ui(θ, 0).
A simple revelation-principle style argument [22, 3] shows that there exist an optimal private signaling
scheme which is direct and persuasive. By direct wemean that signals correspond to actions — in our setting
Σi = {0, 1} for each receiver i — and can be interpreted as action recommendations. A direct scheme is
persuasive if the strategy profile where all receivers follow their recommendations forms an equilibrium
of the resulting Bayesian game.2 Due to the absence of inter-receiver externalities in our setting, such an
equilibrium would necessarily also satisfy the stronger property of being a dominant-strategy equilibrium
— i.e., each receiver imaximizes his posterior expected utility by following the recommendation, regardless
of whether other receivers follow their recommendations.
When designing private signaling schemes, we restrict attention (without loss) to direct and persuasive
schemes. Here, a signal profile can be equivalently viewed as a set S ⊆ [n] of receivers — namely, the set
of receivers who are recommended action 1. Using this alternative representation, a scheme can be specified
by variables ϕ(θ, S) for all θ ∈ Θ, S ⊆ [n]. We can now encode the sender’s optimization problem
of computing the optimal scheme using the following exponentially-large linear program; note the use of
auxiliary variables xθ,i to denote the marginal probability of recommending action 1 to receiver i in state θ.
maximize
∑
θ∈Θ λ(θ)
∑
S⊆[n]ϕ(θ, S)fθ(S)
subject to
∑
S:i∈S ϕ(θ, S) = xθ,i, for i ∈ [n], θ ∈ Θ.∑
θ∈Θ λ(θ)xθ,iui(θ) ≥ 0, for i = 1, ..., n.∑
S⊆[n] ϕ(θ, S) = 1, for θ ∈ Θ.
ϕ(θ, S) ≥ 0, for θ ∈ Θ;S ⊆ [n].
(1)
The second set of constraints in LP (1) are persuasiveness constraints, and state that each receiver
i should maximize his utility by taking action 1 whenever that action 1 is recommended. Note that the
persuasiveness constraints for action 0, which can be written as
∑
θ∈Θ λ(θ)(1 − xθ,i)ui(θ) ≤ 0 for each
i ∈ [n], are intentionally omitted from this LP. This omission is without loss when fθ is a non-decreasing set
function for each θ: any solution to the LP in which a receiver prefers action 1 when recommended action 0
can be improved by always recommending action 1 to that receiver.
2.3 Public Signaling Schemes
A public signaling scheme π can be viewed as a special type of private signaling schemes in which each
receiver must receive the same signal, i.e., only a public signal is sent. Overloading the notation of Sec-
tion 2.2, we use Σ to denote the set of public signals and σ ∈ Σ to denote a public signal. A public signaling
scheme π is fully specified by {π(θ, σ)}θ,σ , where π(θ, σ) denotes the probability of sending signal σ at
state θ. Upon receiving a signal σ, each receiver performs the same Bayesian update and infers a posterior
belief over the state of nature, as follows: the realized state is θ with probability λ(θ)π(θ, σ)/Pr(σ), where
2Persuasiveness has also been called incentive compatibility or obedience in prior work.
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Pr(σ) =
∑
θ∈Θ π(θ, σ). This induces a subgame for each signal σ, one in which all receivers share the
same belief regarding the state of nature.
Whereas in more general settings than ours receivers may play a mixed Nash equilibrium in each sub-
game, our restriction to a setting with no externalities removes this complication. Given a posterior distri-
bution on states of nature (say, one induced by a signal σ), our receivers face disjoint single-agent decision
problems, each of which admits an optimal pure strategy. We assume that receivers break ties in favor of
the sender (specifically, in favor of action 1), which distinguishes a unique pure response for each receiver.
Therefore, our solution concept here distinguishes a unique action profile for each posterior distribution, and
hence for each signal. A simple revelation-principle style argument then allows us to conclude that there
is an optimal public signaling schemes which is direct, meaning that the public signals are action profiles,
and persuasive, meaning that in the subgame induced by signal σ = (σ1, . . . , σn) each receiver i’s optimal
decision problem (which breaks ties in favor of action 1) solves to action σi.
Restricting attention to direct and persuasive public signaling schemes, each signal can also be viewed
as a subset S ⊆ [n] of receivers taking action 1. The sender’s optimization problem can then be written as
the following exponentially-large linear program.
maximize
∑
θ∈Θ λ(θ)
∑
S⊆[n] π(θ, S)fθ(S)
subject to
∑
θ∈Θ λ(θ)π(θ, S) · ui(θ) ≥ 0, for S ⊆ [n] with i ∈ S.∑
S⊆[n] π(θ, S) = 1, for θ ∈ Θ.
π(θ, S) ≥ 0, for θ ∈ Θ;S ⊆ [n].
(2)
The first set of constraints are persuasiveness constraints corresponding to action 1. Note that the per-
suasiveness constraints for action 0, which can be written as
∑
θ∈Θ λ(θ)π(θ, S) ·ui(θ) ≤ 0 for each S ⊆ [n]
and i 6∈ S, are intentionally omitted from this LP. This omission is without loss when fθ is non-decreasing
for each state θ: if signal S with i 6∈ S is such that receiver i prefers action 1 in the resulting subgame, then
we can replace it with the signal S ∪ i without degrading the sender’s utility. We remark that LP (2) and LP
(1) only differ in their persuasiveness constraints.
2.4 Input Models
We distinguish two input models for describing persuasion instances in this paper. The first is the explicit
model, in which the prior distribution λ is given explicitly as a probability vector. The second is the sample
oraclemodel, whereΘ and λ are provided implicitly through sample access to λ. In both models, we assume
that given a state of nature θ, we can efficiently evaluate ui(θ) for each i ∈ [n] and fθ(S) for each S ⊆ [n].
In the explicit input model, by computing a signaling scheme ϕ (whether private or public) we mean that
we explicitly list the non-zero variables ϕ(θ, S) on which the scheme is supported. In the implicit model,
computing a signaling scheme ϕ (whether private or public) amounts to providing an algorithm which takes
as input a state of nature θ, and samples the random variable ϕ(θ).
2.5 Set Functions and Submodularity
Given a finite ground setX, a set function is a map f : 2X → R. Such a function is nonnegative if f(S) ≥ 0
for all S ⊆ X, monotone non-decreasing (or monotone for short) if f(S) ≤ f(T ) for all S ⊆ T . Most
importantly, f is submodular if for any S, T ⊆ X, we have f(S ∪ T ) + f(S ∩ T ) ≤ f(S) + f(T ).
We also consider continuous functions G from the solid hypercube [0, 1]X to the real numbers. Such a
function is nonnegative if G(x) ≥ 0 for all x, monotone non-decreasing (or monotone for short) if G(x) ≤
G(y) whenever x  y (coordinate wise), and smooth submodular (in the sense of [12]) if its second partial
derivatives exist and are non-positive everywhere.
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The Multilinear Extension of a Set Function. Given any set function f : 2X → R, the multilinear
extension of f is the continuous function F : [0, 1]X → R defined as follows:
F (x) =
∑
S⊆X
f(S)
∏
i∈S
xi
∏
i 6∈S
(1− xi), (3)
Notice that, F (x) can be viewed as the expectation of f(S) when the random set S independently includes
each element i with probability xi. In particular, let p
I
x denote the independent distribution with marginals x,
defined by pIx(S) =
∏
i∈S xi
∏
i 6∈S(1−xi), then F (x) = ES∼pIx f(S). If f is nonnegative/monotone then so
is F . Moreover, if f is submodular then F is smooth submodular. For our results, we will need to maximize
F (x) subject to a set of linear constraints on x. This problem is NP-hard in general, yet can be approximated
by the continuous greedy process of Calinescu et al. [12] for fairly general families of constraints. Note that
though we cannot exactly evaluate F (x) in polynomial time, it is sufficient to approximate F (x) within a
good precision in order to apply the continuous greedy process. By an additive FPTAS evaluation oracle for
F , we mean an algorithm that evaluates F (x) within additive error ǫ in poly(n, 1ǫ ) time.
Theorem 2.1 (Adapted form [12]). Let F : [0, 1]n → [0, 1] be a non-negative, monotone, smooth submod-
ular function. Let P ⊆ [0, 1]n be a down-monotone polytope3, specified explicitly by its linear constraints.
Given an additive FPTAS evaluation oracle for F , there is a poly(n, 1ǫ ) time algorithm that outputs x ∈ P
such that F (x) ≥ (1− 1e )OPT − ǫ, where OPT = maxx∈P F (x).
Correlation Gap. A general definition of the correlation gap can be found in [1]. For our results, the fol-
lowing simple definition will suffice. Specifically, for any x ∈ [0, 1]X , letD(x) be the set of all distributions
p over 2X with fixed marginal probability PrS∼p(i ∈ S) = xi for all i. Let pIx, as defined above, be the
independent distribution with marginal probabilities x. Note that pIx ∈ D(x). For any set function f(S), the
correlation gap κ is defined as follows:
κ = max
x∈[0,1]X
max
p∈D(x)
ES∼p f(S)
ES∼pIx f(S)
. (4)
Loosely speaking, the correlation gap upper bounds the “loss” of the expected function value over a random
set by ignoring the correlation in the randomness.
Theorem 2.2 ([1]). The correlation gap κ is upper bounded by ee−1 for any non-negative monotone non-
decreasing submodular function.
3 Equivalence Between Private Signaling and Objective Maximization
In this section, we relate the computational complexity of private persuasion to the complexity of maximiz-
ing the sender’s objective function, and show that the optimal private signaling scheme can be computed
efficiently for a broad class of sender objectives. Let F denote any collection of monotone set functions. We
use I(F) to denote the class of all persuasion instances in our model in which the sender utility function fθ
is in F for all states of nature θ. We restrict attention to the explicit input model for most of this discussion,
though discuss how to extend our results to the sample oracle model, modulo an arbitrarily small additive
loss in both the sender’s objective and the persuasiveness constraints, at the end of this section.
The following theorem establishes the polynomial-time equivalence between computing the optimal
private signaling scheme and the problem of maximizing the objective function plus an additive function.
Note that although the number of variables in LP (1) is exponential in the number of receivers, a vertex
optimal solution of this LP is supported on O(n|Θ|) variables.
3A polytope P ⊆ Rn+ is called down-monotone if for all x, y ∈ R
n
+, if y ∈ P and x  y (coordinate-wise) then x ∈ P .
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Theorem 3.1. Let F be any collection of monotone set functions. There is a polynomial-time algorithm
which computes the optimal private signaling scheme given any instance in I(F) if and only if there is a
polynomial time algorithm for maximizing f(S)+
∑
i∈S wi given any f ∈ F and any set of weights wi ∈ R.
Proof. We first reduce optimal private signaling to maximizing the objective function plus an additive func-
tion, via linear programming duality. In particular, consider the following dual program of LP (1) with
variables wθ,i, αi, yθ.
minimize
∑
θ∈Θ yθ
subject to
∑
i∈S wθ,i + yθ ≥ λ(θ)fθ(S), for S ⊆ [n], θ ∈ Θ.
wθ,i + αiλ(θ)ui(θ) = 0, for i = 1, ..., n.
αi ≥ 0, for i ∈ [n].
(5)
We can obtain a separation oracle for LP (5) given an algorithm for maximizing fθ(S) plus an additive
function. Given any variables wθ,i, αi, yθ, separation over the first set of constraints reduces to maximizing
the set function gθ(S) = fθ(S) −
1
λ(θ)
∑
i∈S wθ,i for each θ ∈ Θ. The other constraints can be checked
directly in linear time. Given the resulting separation oracle, we can use the Ellipsoid method to obtain a
vertex optimal solution to both LP (5) and its dual LP (1) in polynomial time [20].
We now prove the converse. Namely, we construct a polynomial-time Turing reduction from the problem
of maximizing f plus an additive function to a private signaling problem in I(F). At a high level, we first
reduce the set function maximization problem to a certain linear program, and then prove that solving the
dual of the LP reduces to optimal private signaling for a set of particularly constructed instances in I(F).
Given f ∈ F and weights w, our reduction concerns the following linear program, parameterized by
a = (a1, ..., an) and b, with variables z = (z1, ..., zn) and v.
minimize
∑
i∈[n] aizi + bv
subject to
∑
i∈S zi + v ≥ f(S), for S ⊆ [n].
(6)
Let P denote the feasible region of LP (6). As the first step of our reduction, we reduce maximizing the set
function gw(S) = f(S) +
∑
i∈S wi to the separation problem for P. Let zi = −wi for each i. Notice that
(z, v) is feasible (i.e., inP) if and only if v ≥ maxS⊆[n] f(S)−
∑
i∈S zi. Therefore, we can binary search for
a value v˜ such that (z, v˜) is almost feasible, but not quite. More precisely, let B denote the bit complexity of
the f(S)’s and the wi’s, then binary search returns the exact optimal value of the set function maximization
problem after O(B) steps. We then set v˜ to equal that value minus 2−B . Feeding (z, v˜) to the separation
oracle, we obtain a violated constraint which must correspond to the maximizer of f(S) +
∑
i∈S wi.
As the second step of our reduction, we reduce the separation problem for P to solving LP (6) for
every choice of objective coefficients a and b. This polynomial-time Turing reduction follows from the
equivalence of separation and optimization [20].
Third, we reduce solving LP (6) for arbitrary a and b to the special case where a ∈ [0, 1]n and b = 1.
The reduction involves a case analysis. (a) If any of the objective coefficients are negative, then the fact that
P is upwards closed implies that LP (6) is unbounded. (b) If b = 0 and ai > 0 for some i, then the LP
is unbounded since we can make v arbitrarily small and zi arbitrarily large. Normalizing by dividing by b,
we have reduced the problem to the case when b = 1 and a  0 (coordinate-wise). (c) Now suppose that
ai > 1 = b for some i; the LP is unbounded by making zi arbitrarily small and v arbitrarily large. This
analysis leaves the case of b = 1 and a ∈ [0, 1]n.
Fourth, we reduce LP (6) with parameters a ∈ [0, 1]n and b = 1 to its dual shown below, with variables
pS for S ⊆ [n].
maximize
∑
S⊆[n] pSf(S)
subject to
∑
S:i∈S pS ≤ ai, for i ∈ [n].∑
S⊆[n] pS = 1
pS ≥ 0, for S ⊆ [n].
(7)
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We note that LP (7) is not the standard dual of LP (6); in particular the first set of constraints are inequality
rather than equality constraints. It is easy to see that LP (7) is equivalent to the standard dual when f is
monotone non-decreasing, and that an optimal solution to one of the two duals can be easily converted to an
optimal solution of the other.
The fifth and final step of our reduction will reduce LP (7) to a private signaling problem in I(F).
There are n receivers and two states of nature θ0, θ1 with λ(θ0) = λ(θ1) = 1/2. Define ui(θ1) = 1
and ui(θ0) = −
1
ai
(−∞ if ai = 0) for all i. The sender’s utility function satisfies fθ1 = fθ0 = f . Let
ϕ∗ be an optimal signaling scheme, in particular an optimal solution to the instantiation of LP (1) for our
instance. Note that all receivers prefer action 1 in state θ1; therefore, it is easy to see that ϕ
∗ can be weakly
improved, without violating the persuasiveness constraints, by modifying it to always recommend action 1
to all receivers when in state θ1. After this modification, ϕ
∗ is an optimal solution to the following LP, which
optimizes over all signaling schemes satisfying ϕ(θ1, [n]) = 1.
maximize 12f([n]) +
1
2
∑
S⊆[n] ϕ(θ0, S)f(S)
subject to
∑
S:i∈S ϕ(θ0, S) = xθ0,i, for i ∈ [n].
xθ0,i ≤ ai, for i = 1, ..., n.∑
S⊆[n] ϕ(θ0, S) = 1
ϕ(θ0, S) ≥ 0, for θ ∈ Θ;S ⊆ [n].
(8)
It is now easy to see that setting pS = ϕ
∗(θ0, S) yields an optimal solution to LP (7)
As an immediate corollary of Theorem 3.1, the optimal private signaling scheme can be computed
efficiently when the sender’s objective function is supermodular or anonymous. Recall that a set function
f : 2[n] → R is anonymous if there exists a function g : Z→ R such that f(S) = g(|S|).
Corollary 3.2. There is a polynomial time algorithm for computing the optimal private signaling scheme
when the sender objective functions are either supermodular or anonymous.
Proof. Since a supermodular function plus an additive function is still supermodular, and the problem of
unconstrained supermodular maximization can be solved in polynomial time, Theorem 3.1 implies that the
optimal private signaling scheme can also be computed in polynomial time. As for anonymous objectives,
there is a simple algorithm for maximizing an anonymous set function plus an additive function. In par-
ticular, consider the problem of maximizing f(S) +
∑
i∈S wi where f(S) = g(|S|). Observe that fixing
|S| = k, the optimal set Sk corresponds to the k highest-weight elements in w. Enumerating all k and
choosing the best Sk yields the optimal set.
Finally, we make two remarks on Theorem 3.1, particularly on the reduction from optimal private sig-
naling to set function maximization. First, we note that the assumption of monotonicity is not necessary to
the reduction from signaling to optimization. In other words, even without the monotonicity assumption for
the sender’s objective function, one can still efficiently compute the optimal private signaling scheme for
instances in I(F) given access to an oracle for maximizing f(S) +
∑
i∈S wi for any f ∈ F and weight
vector w. This can be verified by adding back the persuasiveness constraints for action 0 to LP (1) and
examining the corresponding dual, which has similar structure to LP (5). We omit the trivial details here.
Consequently, Corollary 3.2 applies to non-monotone supermodular or anonymous functions as well.
Second, our reduction assumes that the prior distribution λ over the state of nature is explicitly given.
This can be generalized to the sample oracle model. In particular, when our only access to λ is through
random sampling, we can implement an ǫ-optimal and ǫ-persuasive4 private signaling scheme in poly(n, 1ǫ )
4This is the natural relaxation of persuasiveness. In our setting, a receiver approximately maximizes his posterior expected
payoff, to within an additive ǫ, by following the scheme’s recommendation. This is regardless of the actions of other receivers.
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time using an idea from [15] (assuming ui(θ) ∈ [−1, 1]). The algorithm is as follows: given any input
state θ, we first take poly(n, 1ǫ ) samples from λ, and then solve LP (1) on the empirical distribution of the
samples plus θ, with relaxed (by ǫ) persuasiveness constraints. Finally, we signal for θ as the solution to the
LP suggests. The analysis of this algorithm is very similar to that in [15], thus is omitted here. Moreover,
the bi-criteria loss is inevitable in this oracle model due to information theoretic reasons [15].
4 Private Signaling with Submodular Objectives
In this section we consider optimal private signaling for submodular sender objectives, and show that there
is a polynomial time (1 − 1e )-approximation scheme, modulo an additive loss of ǫ. This is almost the best
possible: Babichenko and Barman [4] show that even in the special case of two states of nature, it is NP-
hard to approximate the optimal private signaling scheme within a factor better than (1 − 1e ) for monotone
submodular sender objectives.
Theorem 4.1. Consider private signaling with monotone submodular sender objectives. Let OPT denote
the optimal sender utility. For any ǫ > 0, a private signaling scheme achieving expected sender utility at
least (1− 1e )OPT − ǫ can be implemented in poly(n, |Θ|,
1
ǫ ) time.
The main technical challenge in proving Theorem 4.1 is that a private signaling scheme may have ex-
ponentially large support, as apparent from linear program (1). To overcome this difficulty, we prove a
structural characterization of (approximately) optimal persuasive private schemes, i.e., solutions to LP (1).
Roughly speaking, we show that LP (1) always has an approximately optimal solution with polynomial-
sized support and nicely structured distributions. This greatly narrows down the solution space we need to
search over. Recall that for any θ, ϕ(θ) is a random variable supported on 2[n]. We say ϕ(θ) isK-uniform if
it follows a uniform distribution on a multiset of sizeK . The following lemma exhibits a structural property
regarding (approximately) optimal solutions to LP (1). Notably, this property only depends on monotonicity
of the sender’s objective functions and does not depend on submodularity. Its proof is postponed to the end
of this section.
Lemma 4.2. Let fθ be monotone for each θ. For any ǫ > 0, there exists an ǫ-optimal persuasive private
signaling scheme ϕ such that ϕ(θ) isK-uniform for every θ, where K = 108n log(2n|Θ|)
ǫ3
.
By Lemma 4.2, we can, without much loss, restrict our design of ϕ(θ) to the special class ofK-uniform
distributions. Note that a K-uniform distribution ϕ(θ) can be described by variables xjθ,i ∈ {0, 1} for
i ∈ [n], j ∈ [K], where xjθ,i denotes the recommended action to receiver i in the j’th profile in the support
of ϕ(θ). Relaxing our variables to lie in [0, 1], this leads to optimization problem (9), where Fθ(x) =∑
S⊆[n] fθ(S)
∏
i∈S xi
∏
i 6∈S(1− xi) is the multi-linear extension of fθ.
maximize
∑
θ∈Θ
λ(θ)
K
∑K
j=1 Fθ(x
j
θ)
subject to
∑
θ∈Θ
λ(θ)
K
∑K
j=1 x
j
θ,iui(θ) ≥ 0, for i = 1, ..., n.
0 ≤ xjθ,i ≤ 1, for i = 1, ..., n; θ ∈ Θ.
(9)
As a high level, our algorithm first approximately solves Program (9) and then signals according to its
solution. Details are in Algorithm 1, which we instantiate with ǫ > 0 and K = 108n log(2n|Θ|)ǫ3 . Since
Fθ(x) = ES∼pIx f(S) where p
I
x is the independent distribution over 2
[n] with marginal probability x, the
expected sender utility induced by the signaling scheme in Algorithm 1 is precisely the objective value of
Program (9) at the obtained solution. Theorem 4.1 then follows from two claims: 1. The optimal objective
value of Program (9) is ǫ-close to the optimal sender utility (Claim 4.3 ); 2. The continuous greedy process
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[12] can be applied to Program (9) to efficiently compute a (1− 1/e)-approximate solution, modulo a small
additive loss (Claim 4.4). We remark that Theorem 4.1 can be generalized to the sample oracle model, but
with an additional ǫ-loss in persuasiveness constraints (assuming ui(θ) ∈ [−1, 1]), using the idea from [15].
Algorithm 1 Private Signaling Scheme for Submodular Sender Objectives
Parameter: ǫ > 0
Input: Prior distribution λ supported on Θ
Input: ui(θ)’s and value oracle access to the sender utility fθ(S)
Input: State of nature θ
Output: A set S ⊆ [n] indicating the set of receivers who will be recommended action 1.
1: Approximately solve Program (9). Let {x˜jθ,i}θ∈Θ,i∈[n],j∈[K] be the returned solution.
2: Choose j from [K] uniformly at random; For each receiver i, add i to S independently with probability
x˜jθ,i.
3: Return S.
Claim 4.3. When K = 108n log(2n|Θ|)
ǫ3
, the optimal objective value of Program (9) is at least OPT − ǫ,
where OPT is the optimal sender utility in private signaling.
Proof. By Lemma 4.2, there exists a private signaling scheme ϕ such that: (i) ϕ achieves sender utility at
least OPT − ǫ; (ii) for each θ, there exists K sets S1θ , ..., S
K
θ ⊆ [n] such that ϕθ is a uniform distribution
over {S1θ , ..., S
K
θ }. Utilizing ϕ, we can construct a feasible solution x to Program (9) with objective value
at least OPT − ǫ. In particular, let xjθ ∈ {0, 1}
n be the indicator vector of the set Sjθ , formally defined as
follows: xjθ,i = 1 if and only if i ∈ S
j
θ . By referring to the feasibility of ϕ to LP (1), it is easy to check
that xjθ,i’s are feasible to Program (9). Moreover, since Fθ(x
j
θ) = fθ(S
j
θ), the objective value of Program
(9) at the solution x equals the objective value of Program (1) at the solution ϕ, which is at least OPT − ǫ.
Therefore, the optimal objective value of Program (9) is at least OPT − ǫ, as desired.
Claim 4.4. There is an algorithm that runs in poly(n, |Θ|,K, 1ǫ ) time and computes a (1−1/e)-approximate
solution, modulo an additive loss of ǫ/e, to Program (9).
Proof. The objective function of Program (9) is a linear combination, with non-negative coefficients, of mul-
tilinear extensions of monotone submodular functions, thus is smooth, monotone and submodular. More-
over, the function value can be evaluated within error ǫ by poly(n, 1ǫ ) random samples, thus in poly(n,
1
ǫ )
time. To apply Theorem 2.1, we only need to prove that the feasible region is a down-monotone polytope.
Observe that there always exists an optimal solution to Program (9) such that xθ,i = 1 for any θ, i such
that ui(θ) ≥ 0. Therefore, w.l.o.g., we can pre-set these variables to be 1 and view the program as an
optimization problem over xθ,i’s for all θ, i such that ui(θ) < 0. It is easy to check that these xθ,i’s form a
down-monotone polytope determined by polynomially many constraints, as desired.
Proof of Lemma 4.2
Our proof is based on the probabilistic method. Recall that the optimal private signaling scheme can be
computed by solving the exponentially-large LP (1). Roughly speaking, given any optimal private scheme
ϕ∗, we will take polynomially many samples from ϕ∗(θ) for each θ, and prove that with strictly positive
probability the corresponding empirical distributions form a solution to LP (1) that is close to optimality.
However, the sampling approach usually suffers from ǫ-loss in both the objective and persuasiveness con-
straints. It turns out that the ǫ-loss to persuasiveness constraints can be avoided in our setting with carefully
designed pre-processing steps.
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At a high level, to get rid of the ǫ-loss in persuasiveness constraints, there are twomain technical barriers.
The first is to handle the estimation error in the receiver’s utilities, which is inevitable due to sampling. We
address this by adjusting the ϕ∗ to strengthen the persuasiveness constraints so that a small estimation
error would still preserve the original persuasiveness constraints. The second barrier arises when some
x∗θ,i’s are smaller than inverse polynomial of the precision ǫ, then poly(
1
ǫ ) samples cannot guarantee a good
multiplicative estimate of x∗θ,i. We deal with this issue by making “honest” recommendation, i.e., action 0,
at these cases, and show that such modification will not cause much loss to our objective.
We first introduce some convenient notations. For any receiver i, let set Θ+i = {θ : ui(θ) ≥ 0} be the
set of states at which receiver i (weakly) prefers action 1; Similarly, Θ−i = {θ : ui(θ) < 0} be the set of
states at which receiver i prefers action 0. Moreover, for any state of nature θ, let I+θ = {i : ui(θ) ≥ 0}
be the set of receivers who (weakly) prefer action 1 at state θ. It would be convenient to think of {Θ+i }i∈[n]
and {I+θ }θ∈Θ as two different partitions of the set {(θ, i) : ui(θ) ≥ 0}.
Observe that by monotonicity there always exists an optimal signaling scheme ϕ∗ such that x∗θ,i = 1 for
every θ ∈ Θ+i . Let ϕ
∗ be such an optimal signaling scheme and OPT denote the optimal sender utility. We
now adjust the scheme ϕ∗ such that they do not degrade the objective value by much but is more suitable
for applying concentration bounds for our probabilistic argument.
Adjustment 1: Always Recommend Action 0When x∗θ,i <
ǫ
3n
Note that x∗θ,i <
ǫ
3n only when θ ∈ Θ
−
i , i.e., action 0 is the best action for receiver i conditioned on
θ. We first adjust ϕ∗ to obtain a new scheme ϕ˜, as follows: ϕ˜ is the same as ϕ∗ except that for every θ, i
such that x∗θ,i <
ǫ
3n , ϕ˜ always recommends action 0 to receiver i given the state of nature θ. As a result,
x˜θ,i equals x
∗
θ,i whenever x
∗
θ,i ≥
ǫ
3n and equals 0 otherwise. Note that the signaling scheme still satisfies the
persuasiveness constraints.
Naturally, each adjustment above, corresponding to θ, i satisfying x∗θ,i <
ǫ
3n , could decrease the ob-
jective value since the marginal probability of recommending action 1 decreases. Nevertheless, this loss,
denoted as L(θ, i), can be properly bounded as follows:
L(θ, i) = λ(θ) ·
[ ∑
S:i∈S
ϕ∗(θ, S)fθ(S)−
∑
S:i∈S
ϕ∗(θ, S)fθ(S \ {i})
]
≤ λ(θ) ·
[ ∑
S:i∈S
ϕ∗(θ, S)
]
= λ(θ)x∗θ,i ≤
λ(θ)ǫ
3n
.
As a result, the aggregated loss of all the adjustments made in this step can be upper bounded by∑
θ∈Θ
∑n
i=1
λ(θ)ǫ
3n =
ǫ
3 . That is, the objective value of ϕ˜ is at least OPT −
ǫ
3 .
Adjustment 2: Strengthen the Persuasive Constraints by Scaling Down xθ,i’s
We now strengthen the persuasiveness constraints by further adjusting the ϕ˜ obtained from above so that
a small estimation error due to sampling will still maintain the original persuasiveness constraints. For any θ,
we define ϕ′(θ, S) = 33+ǫ ϕ˜(θ, S) for all S 6= I
+
θ , and define ϕ
′(θ, I+θ ) = 1−
∑
S 6=I+
θ
ϕ′(θ, S). Obviously,
ϕ′θ is still a distribution over 2
[n]. Moreover, we claim that x′θ,i = ES∼ϕ′θ I(i ∈ S) = 1 whenever x˜θ,i = 1,
i.e., θ ∈ Θ+i . That is, given state θ, any receiver i ∈ I
+
θ will still aways be recommended action 1. This
is because, to construct ϕ′θ , we moved some probability mass from all other sets S to the set I
+
θ , therefore
the marginal probability of recommending action 1 to any receiver i ∈ I+θ will not decrease. However, this
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marginal probability is originally 1 in the solution of ϕ˜. Therefore, x′θ,i still equals 1 for any i ∈ I
+
θ , or
equivalently, for any θ ∈ Θ+i . Similarly, we also have x
′
θ,i = 0 whenever x˜θ,i = 0.
Let V al(ϕ) denote the objective value of a scheme ϕ. We claim that V al(ϕ′) ≥ OPT − 2ǫ3 and ϕ
′
satisfies x′θ,i =
3
3+ǫ x˜θ,i for every θ ∈ Θ
−
i . For any i ∈ [n], θ ∈ Θ
−
i (which means i 6∈ I
+
θ ), we have
x′θ,i =
∑
S:i∈S
ϕ′(θ, S) =
3
3 + ǫ
∑
S:i∈S
ϕ˜(θ, S) =
3
3 + ǫ
x˜θ,i,
since the summation excludes the term ϕ′(θ, I+θ ). We now prove the guarantee of the objective value.
Observe that ϕ′(θ, I+θ ) ≥
3
3+ǫ ϕ˜(θ, I
+
θ ) also holds in our construction. Therefore, we have
V al(ϕ′) =
∑
θ∈Θ
λ(θ)
∑
S⊆[n]
ϕ′(θ, S)fθ(S)
≥
3
3 + ǫ
∑
θ∈Θ
λ(θ)
∑
S⊆[n]
ϕ˜(θ, S)fθ(S)
=
3
3 + ǫ
· V al(ϕ˜)
≥ OPT −
2ǫ
3
,
where we used the upper bound V al(ϕ˜) ≤ 1.
Existence of An ǫ-Optimal Solution of Small Support.
The above two steps of adjustment result in a feasible 2ǫ3 -optimal solution ϕ
′ to LP (1) that satisfies the
following properties: (i) x′θ,i = x
∗
θ,i = 1 whenever ui(θ) ≥ 0; (ii) x
′
θ,i =
3
3+ǫ x˜θ,i =
3
3+ǫx
∗
θ,i ≥
ǫ
4n when
x∗θ,i ≥
ǫ
3n and θ ∈ Θ
−
i ; (iii) x
′
θ,i = 0 when x
∗
θ,i <
ǫ
3n and θ ∈ Θ
−
i . Utilizing such a ϕ
′ we show that there
exists an ǫ-optimal solution ϕ to LP (1) such that the distribution ϕθ is a K-uniform distribution for every
θ, whereK = 108n log(2n|Θ|)
ǫ3
.
Our proof is based on the probabilistic method. For each θ, independently take K = 108n log(2n|Θ|)
ǫ3
samples from random variable ϕ′(θ), and let ϕθ denote the corresponding empirical distribution. Obviously,
ϕθ is a K-uniform distribution. We claim that with strictly positive probability over the randomness of the
samples, ϕ is feasible to LP (1) and achieves utility at least V al(ϕ′)− ǫ3 ≥ OPT − ǫ.
We first examine the objective value. Observe that the objective value V al(ϕ′) can be viewed as the
expectation of the random variable
∑
θ∈Θ λ(θ)fθ(Sθ) ∈ [0, 1], where Sθ follows the distribution of ϕ
′(θ).
Our sampling procedure generates K samples for the random variable {Sθ}θ∈Θ, therefore by the Hoeffding
bound, with probability at least 1 − exp(−2Kǫ2/9) > 1 − 1/(2n|Θ|), the empirical mean is at least
V al(ϕ′)− ǫ/3.
Now we only need to show that all the persuasiveness constraints are preserved with high probability.
First, observe that if x′θ,i = 0, then xθ,i induced by ϕ also equals 0. This is because x
′
θ,i = ES∼ϕ′(θ) I(i ∈
S) = 0 implies that i is not contained in any S from the support of ϕ′(θ), therefore, also not contained in
any sample. Similarly, x′θ,i = 1 implies xθ,i = 1. To show that all the persuasiveness constraints hold, we
only need to argue that xθ,i ≤ x
∗
θ,i for every θ ∈ Θ
−
i satisfying x
∗
θ,i ≥
ǫ
3n . This holds with high probability
by tail bounds. In particular, x′θ,i = ES∼ϕ′(θ) I(i ∈ S) and we take K samples from ϕ
′(θ). By the Chernoff
bound, with probability at least
1− exp(−
Kǫ2x′θ,i
27
) ≥ 1− exp(−
Kǫ3
108n
) > 1−
1
2n|Θ|
,
14
the empirical mean xθ,i is at most (1 + ǫ/3)x
′
θ,i = x
∗
θ,i.
Note that there are at most n|Θ| choices of such θ, i. By union bound, with probability at least 1 −
(n|Θ|+1)/(2n|Θ|) > 0, ϕ satisfies all the persuasiveness constraints thus is feasible to LP (1), and achieves
objective value at least V al(ϕ′)− ǫ3 ≥ OPT − ǫ. So there must exist a feasible ǫ-optimal solution ϕ to LP
(1) such that ϕθ is K-uniform for every θ. This concludes our proof of Lemma 4.2.
5 An Oblivious Private Scheme for Binary-State Settings
In this section, we consider the special case with two states of nature, denoted by θ0 and θ1, and submodular
sender utility functions. We show that a (1 − 1e )-approximate private signaling scheme can be explicitly
constructed. The approximation ratio is tight by [4]. Moreover, the constructed signaling scheme has the
following distinctive properties: (i) it signals independently to each receiver, which we term an independent
signaling scheme; (ii) it is oblivious in the sense that it does not depend on the sender’s utility function so
long as it is monotone submodular.
In particular, we consider the following independent signaling scheme ϕI . Given any state of nature
θ ∈ {θ0, θ1}, ϕI recommends action 1 to receiver i independently with probability xθ,i for each i ∈ [n] and
recommends action 0 otherwise, where xθ,i’s are defined as follows:
If ui(θ0) < 0 and ui(θ1) < 0, then xθ,i = 0 for any θ ∈ {θ0, θ1}
If ui(θ0) ≥ 0 and ui(θ1) ≥ 0, then xθ,i = 1 for any θ ∈ {θ0, θ1}.
If ui(θ0) ≥ 0 and ui(θ1) < 0, then xθ0,i = 1 and xθ1,i = min{−
λ(θ0)ui(θ0)
λ(θ1)ui(θ1)
, 1}.
If ui(θ0) < 0 and ui(θ1) ≥ 0, then xθ1,i = 1 and xθ0,i = min{−
λ(θ1)ui(θ1)
λ(θ0)ui(θ0)
, 1}.
(10)
Observe that ϕI is precisely the scheme that maximizes the probability of recommending action 1 to each
receiver i independently. Notice that ϕI is only determined by the receiver’s payoffs, and does not depend
on the sender’s payoff function fθ(S). Nevertheless, the following theorem shows that ϕI is approximately
optimal.
Theorem 5.1. In the binary-state setting with monotone submodular sender objectives, the scheme ϕI is a
(1− 1e )-approximate private signaling scheme.
To prove Theorem 5.1, we first exhibit an optimization program, i.e., Program (11), that computes the
optimal independent signaling scheme, i.e., the independent scheme that achieves the maximum sender
utility among all independent signaling schemes. Here the variables xθ,i denote the probability of recom-
mending action 1 to bidder i given the state of nature θ. Notice that
∑
S⊆[n] fθ(S)
∏
i∈S xθ,i
∏
i 6∈S(1−xθ,i)
in the objective is precisely the multi-linear extension of fθ at xθ = (xθ,1, ..., xθ,n)
T . Theorem 5.1 follows
from two lemmas: 1. The optimal independent signaling scheme serves as a (1 − 1e )-approximation to the
optimal private signaling scheme (Lemma 5.2); 2. When there are two states of nature, the ϕI defined above
is an optimal independent signaling scheme (Lemma 5.3).
maximize
∑
θ∈Θ λ(θ)
∑
S⊆[n] fθ(S)
∏
i∈S xθ,i
∏
i 6∈S(1− xθ,i)
subject to
∑
θ∈Θ λ(θ)xθ,iui(θ) ≥ 0, for i = 1, ..., n.
0 ≤ xθ,i ≤ 1, for i = 1, ..., n; θ ∈ Θ.
(11)
Optimal Independent Signaling Problem
Lemma 5.2. In the multiple-state setting with monotone submodular sender objectives, the optimal inde-
pendent signaling scheme is a (1− 1e )-approximation to the optimal private signaling scheme.
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Proof. Let ϕ∗ be any optimal private signaling scheme and OPT denote the optimal sender utility. There-
fore, the principle’s optimal utility can be expressed as follows.
OPT =
∑
θ∈Θ
λ(θ)
∑
S⊆[n]
fθ(S)ϕ
∗(θ, S) =
∑
θ∈Θ
λ(θ) E
S∼ϕ∗(θ)
fθ(S).
Let x∗θ,i =
∑
i∈S ϕ
∗(θ, S) denote the marginal probability of recommending action 1 to receiver i by ϕ∗
given the state of nature θ. Since ϕ∗ is a direct signaling scheme and satisfies the persuasiveness constraints,
so {x∗θ,i}θ∈Θ,i∈[n] is a feasible solution to Program (11). Let V al(x
∗) denote the corresponding objective
value of {x∗θ,i}θ∈Θ,i∈[n] in Program (11). We shall prove that V al(x
∗) ≥ (1− 1e )OPT .
Let xθ denote the vector (xθ,1, ..., xθ,n)
T . Observe that the objective function of Program (11) is pre-
cisely
∑
θ∈Θ λ(θ)ES∼pIxθ fθ(S) where p
I
xθ
is the independent distribution with marginal xθ. Utilizing the
correlation gap for monotone submodular functions, we have
ES∼ϕ∗
θ
fθ(S)
ES∼pI
x∗
θ
fθ(S)
≤ max
p∈Dx∗
θ
ES∼p fθ(S)
ES∼pI
x∗
θ
fθ(S)
≤
e
e− 1
That is, ES∼pI
x∗
θ
fθ(S) ≥ (1−
1
e )ES∼ϕ∗θ fθ(S) for every θ. Therefore,
V al(x∗)
OPT
=
∑
θ∈Θ λ(θ) ·ES∼pI
x∗
θ
fθ(S)∑
θ∈Θ λ(θ) · ES∼ϕ∗θ fθ(S)
≥ 1−
1
e
.
Note that the optimal objective value of Program (11) is at least V al(x∗) thus is at least (1− 1/e)OPT .
Therefore if {xθ,i}θ∈Θ,i∈[n] is the optimal solution to Program (11), then the scheme, which independently
recommends action 1 to receiver i with probability xθ,i and action 0 otherwise at state θ, achieves sender
utility at least (1− 1e )OPT , therefore is an (1−
1
e )-approximation to the optimal private signaling scheme.
Lemma 5.3. In the binary-state setting with monotone sender objectives, the ϕI defined above is an optimal
independent signaling scheme.
Proof. First observe that the objective function of Program (11) is non-decreasing in xθ,i due to the mono-
tonicity of fθ(S) and the non-negativity of λ(θ). The optimality of ϕI simply follows from the monotonicity.
In particular, when ui(θ0) < 0 and ui(θ1) < 0, any feasible solution to Program (11) must satisfy xθ,i = 0
for any θ, i.e., receiver i can never be persuaded to take action 1. On the other hand, when ui(θ0) ≥ 0
and ui(θ1) ≥ 0, the sender can always recommend action 1 to receiver i, so we have xθ,i = 1 for any θ.
Now consider the case ui(θ0) ≥ 0 and ui(θ1) < 0. If xθ0,i < 1 at optimality, then resetting its value to
1 neither decreases the objective value due to monotonicity nor violates the persuasiveness constraint since
ui(θ0) ≥ 0. Moreover, given that xθ0,i = 1, the maximum possible value of xθ1,i that still maintains feasi-
bility is precisely min{−λ(θ0)ui(θ0)λ(θ1)ui(θ1) , 1}, as we defined in (10). The case for ui(θ0) < 0 and ui(θ1) ≥ 0 is
similarly derived. Thus ϕI is optimal to Program (11) .
We conclude this section with two negative results regarding generalizing Theorem 5.1 to many states
of natures. We first show that it is NP-hard to approximate the optimal independent signaling scheme within
a factor better than (1 − 1e ) when there are multiple states of nature (Proposition 5.4). We then prove that
the best oblivious scheme can perform poorly in terms of the sender utility when there are multiple states
(Proposition 5.5).
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Proposition 5.4. In the multiple-state setting with monotone submodular sender objectives, it is NP-hard to
compute an independent signaling scheme that (1− 1/e)-approximates the optimal independent scheme.
Proof. We reduce the Submodular Welfare Problem (SWP) to solving Program (11). The SWP is a classic
problem of combinatorial auctions, described as follows: given n items and m bidders with monotone
submodular utility functions fi : 2
[n] → R+, we seek a partition of the items into disjoint sets S1, ..., Sm,
each for a bidder, in order to maximize the total welfare
∑m
i=1 fi(Si). This problem is first studied by Khot
et al. [24]. They prove that it is NP-hard to approximate the optimal welfare within a factor better than
(1− 1e ). To prove the proposition, we provide a reduction from SWP to solving Program (11).
Consider an SWP instance with n items and m bidders. Bidder j’s utility function fj : 2
[n] → R+ is
monotone submodular. We now construct a private persuasion instance. For the reduction, it helps to think
of items as receivers and bidders as states of nature. In particular, consider a persuasion instance with n
receivers andm+1 equally possible states of nature θ0, ..., θm, where θj corresponds to bidder j for j > 0.
For each θj with j > 0, define ui(θj) = −1 for all receiver i and the sender’s utility function conditioned
on state θj as fj . State θ0 is a special state with ui(θ0) = 1 for all receive i and fθ0(S) = 0 for all set S.
We claim that the optimal objective value of Program (11) for our constructed private persuasion instance
equals, up to a scale factor 1/(m+ 1), the optimal welfare of the given SWP instance.
By monotonicity, w.l.o.g., we can assume xθ0,i = 1 for all i at optimality since ui(θ0) > 0. After
pre-setting the values of these variables, Program (11) can be re-written as follows.
maximize 1m+1
∑m
j=1 Fj(xθj )
subject to
∑n
j=1 xθj ,i ≤ 1, for i = 1, ..., n.
0 ≤ xθj ,i ≤ 1, for i = 1, ..., n; j = 1, ...,m.
By viewing xθj ,i as the probability of allocating item i to player j, the above optimization program corre-
sponds precisely to the given SWP instance above, up to a scaling of the objective, except that the allocation
is now allowed to be randomized. In particular, the constraints form a partition matroid polytope. Since
any fractional allocation can be efficiently rounded to a deterministic allocation achieving the same welfare
(e.g., use Pipage rounding [12]), an α-approximate solution to Program (11) yields an α-approximate deter-
ministic allocation for the SWP instance. Since it is NP-hard to approximate SWP within a ratio better than
(1− 1e ), the same approximation hardness holds for solving Program (11), completing the proof.
Proposition 5.5. For any integer m > 1, there exists an instance with m states of nature such that any
oblivious private scheme can achieve at most 1⌊√m−1⌋ fraction of the optimal sender utility.
Proof. At a high level, we will construct a class of persuasion problems with the same receiver payoffs
but different sender utility functions. Therefore any oblivious private signaling scheme should be the same
across all the constructed instances. However we prove, via Yao’s principle, that it will perform poorly in at
least one of these instances.
Consider the persuasion problem with n receivers and m + 1 = n2 + 1 states of nature, denoted as
θ0, θ1, ..., θm, each occurring with equal probability. The sender’s utility function for each state is one of the
following two simple functions: f0 ≡ 0 and f1 satisfying f1(S) = 0when S = ∅ and f1(S) = 1 otherwise.
We reserve the flexibility of choosing the sender’s objective function from one of these two functions at each
state. The state θ0 is a special state with ui(θ0) = 1 for every i and sender utility function fθ0 = f
0 always.
Let ui(θj) = −1 for every j > 0 and every i ∈ [n], therefore the receivers’ payoffs are fixed. We now define
the possible different ways of defining the sender’s objective function at different states. In particular, let
assignment A : {θ1, ..., θm} → {f0, f1} denote a deterministic mapping that assigns an objective function
to each state θj for j > 0 and satisfies that exactly n states are mapped to function f1. We use A to denote
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all such assignments. Since each A also uniquely determines a concrete persuasion instance, we will also
think of A as the set of all the constructed instances.
For any instance A ∈ A and a private signaling scheme ϕ for A, we use u(ϕ,A) to denote the sender’s
expected utility by using scheme ϕ for instance A. Observe that, for any instance A, the optimal private
signaling scheme is to recommend action 1 to every receiver at state θ0, recommend action 1 to exactly one
receiver, distinctly across different states, at each state with sender objective function f1, and recommend
action 0 otherwise. The optimal sender utility is nm+1 . On the other hand, since all the instances in A
have the same receiver payoffs, these instances will use the same oblivious private signaling scheme. Let P
denote the set of all private signaling schemes ϕ = {ϕ(θ, S)}θ,S for any instance in A. Note that P only
depends on receivers’ payoffs, thus is the same for any instance in A. For any ϕ ∈ P, the approximation
ratio of ϕ as an oblivious scheme is minA∈A
u(ϕ,A)
n/(m+1) . By Yao’s principle, we have
min
A∈A
u(ϕ,A) ≤ max
ϕ∈P
EA∼D[u(ϕ,A)], ∀ϕ ∈ P
where D is an arbitrary distribution over set A. Now, let D be the uniform distribution over A, then the best
oblivious signaling scheme is simply to persuade n receivers separately at arbitrarily chosen n states since
states are symmetric and indistinguishable under distribution D. Some calculation shows that the expected
utility is 1m+1 = maxϕ∈P EA∼D[u(ϕ,A)] for uniform distribution D. Therefore, the best approximation
ratio of any oblivious scheme is
max
ϕ∈P
min
A∈A
u(ϕ,A)
n/(m+ 1)
≤
m+ 1
n
·
1
m+ 1
=
1
n
.
6 Inefficacy and Hardness of Public Persuasion
In this section, we turn our attention to the design of optimal public signaling schemes, and show a stark
contrast with private signaling, both in terms of their efficacy at optimizing the sender’s utility, and in terms
of their computational complexity.
We start with an example illustrating how the restriction to public signaling can drastically reduce the
sender’s expected utility. The example is notably simple: two states of nature, and a binary sender utility
function which is independent of the state of nature. We show a multiplicative gap of Ω(n), and an additive
gap of 1− 1Ω(n) , between the expected sender utility from the optimal private and public signaling schemes,
where n is the number of receivers.
Example 6.1 (Inefficacy of Public Signaling Schemes). Consider an instance with n identical receivers and
two states of natureΘ = {H,L}. Each receiver has the same utility function, defined as follows: ui(H) = 1
and ui(L) = −1, for all i. The state of natureH occurs with probability
1
n+1 , and L occurs with probability
n
n+1 . The sender’s utility function is fθ(S) = f(S) = min(|S|, 1). In other words, the sender gets utility 1
precisely when at least one receiver takes action 1.
The persuasiveness constraints imply that each receiver can take action 1 with probability no more than
2
n+1 . This is achievable by always recommending action 1 to the receiver in state H, and recommending
action 0 with probability 1n in state L. The sender’s expected utility depends on how these recommendations
are correlated.
The optimal private scheme anti-correlates the receivers’ recommendations in order to guarantee that
at least one receiver takes action 1 always, which achieves an expected sender utility of 1, the maximum
possible. Specifically, in state H the scheme always recommends action 1 to every receiver, and in state L
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the scheme chooses one receiver uniformly at random and recommends action 1 to that receiver, and action
0 to the other receivers.
We argue that no public scheme can achieve sender utility more than 2n+1 . Indeed, since receivers are
identical, our solution concept implies that they choose the same action for every realization of a public
signal. Therefore, the best that a public scheme can do is to recommend action 1 to all receivers simultane-
ously with probability 2n+1 in aggregate, and recommend action 0 with the remaining probability, yielding
an expected sender utility of 2n+1 . This is achievable: in state H the scheme always recommends action 1
to every receiver, and in state L the scheme recommends action 1 to all receivers with probability 1n , and
action 0 to all receivers with probability 1− 1n .
Our next result illustrates the computational barrier to obtaining the optimal public signaling scheme,
even for additive sender utility functions. Our proof is inspired by a reduction in [14] for proving the
hardness of computing the best posterior distribution over Θ, a problem termed mixture selection in [14],
in a voting setting. That reduction is from the maximum independent set problem. Since a public signaling
scheme is a combination of posterior distributions, one for each signal, we require a more involved reduction
from a graph-coloring problem to prove our result.
Theorem 6.2. Consider public signaling in our model, with sender utility function fθ(S) = f(S) =
|S|
n . It
is NP-hard to approximate the optimal sender utility to within any constant multiplicative factor. Moreover,
there is no additive PTAS for evaluating the optimal sender utility, unless P = NP.
Proof. We prove by reducing from the following NP-hard problem. In particular, [23] prove that for any
positive integer k, any integer q such that q ≥ 2k + 1, and an arbitrarily small constant ǫ > 0, given an
undirected graph G, it is NP-hard to distinguish between the following two cases:
• Case 1: There is a q-colorable induced subgraph of G containing a (1 − ǫ) fraction of all vertices,
where each color class contains a 1−ǫq fraction of all vertices.
• Case 2: Every independent set in G contains less than a 1
qk+1
fraction of all vertices.
Given graph G with vertices [n] = {1, . . . , n} and edges E, we will construct a public persuasion instance
so that the desired algorithm for approximating the optimal sender utility can be used to distinguish these
two cases. Our construction is similar to that in [14]. We let there be n receivers, and let Θ = [n]. In
other words, both receivers and states of nature correspond to vertices of the graph. We fix the uniform prior
distribution over states of nature — i.e., the realized state of nature is a uniformly-drawn vertex in the graph.
We define the receiver utilities as follows: ui(θ) =
1
2 if i = θ; ui(θ) = −1 if (i, θ) ∈ E; and ui(θ) = −
1
4n
otherwise. We define the sender’s utility function, with range [0, 1], to be fθ(S) = f(S) =
|S|
n . The
following claim is proven in [14].
Claim 6.3 ([14]). For any distribution x ∈ ∆Θ, the set S = {i ∈ [n] :
∑
θ∈Θ xθui(θ) ≥ 0} is an
independent set of G.
Claim 6.3 implies that upon receiving any public signal with any posterior distribution x over Θ, the
players who take action 1 always form an independent set of G. Therefore, if the graph G is from Case 2,
the sender’s expected utility in any public signaling scheme is at most 1
qk+1
.
Now supposing that G is from Case 1, we fix the corresponding coloring of (1 − ǫ)n vertices with
colors k = 1, . . . , q, and we use this coloring to construct a public scheme achieving expected sender utility
at least
(1−ǫ)2
q . The scheme uses q + 1 signals, and is as follows: if θ has color k then deterministically
send the signal k, and if θ is uncolored then deterministically send the signal 0. Given signal k > 0, the
posterior distribution on states of nature is the uniform distribution over the vertices with color k — an
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independent set Sk of size
1−ǫ
q n. It is easy to verify that receivers i ∈ Sk prefer action 1 to action 0, since∑
θ∈Sk
1
|Sk|ui(θ) =
1
|Sk|(
1
2 −
|Sk|−1
4n ) >
1
4|Sk| ≥ 0. Therefore, the sender’s utility is f(Sk) =
|Sk|
n =
1−ǫ
q
whenever k > 0. Since signal 0 has probability ǫ, we conclude that the sender’s expected utility is at least
(1−ǫ)2
q , as needed.
Since distinguishing Case 1 and Case 2 is NP-hard for arbitrarily large constants k and q, we conclude
that it is NP-hard to approximate the optimal sender utility to within any constant factor. Moreover, by
setting k = 1, q = 3, we conclude that the sender’s utility cannot be approximated additively to within
(1− ǫ)2/3− 1/32 > 1/9, and thus there is no additive PTAS, unless P=NP.
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